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FRJENDS OF THE EARTH, INC. V EPA:
THE DAILY PLUNGE INTO TROUBLED WATERS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The contemporary history of America's water quality is troubling. In the Nation's recent past, "the Potomac River was too polluted for swimming . . .and the Cuyahoga River had burst into
flames."' Several of our Nation's bodies of water were so polluted
they were unsuitable for drinking and recreation; the polluted bodies of water were hardly cleaner than open sewers. 2 In response to
this crisis, Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (CWA) to improve the state of polluted bodies of water across the Nation. 3 The
CWA requires each state to establish Total Maximum Daily Loads
(TMDLs) of pollutants permissible to be discharged into each
troubled body of water and submit the established TMDLs to the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for approval. 4 Even after
the CWA was enacted, many of the Nation's waters remain highly
5
polluted and unsafe for aquatic life and recreational use.
Thus far the EPA has approved effluent loads for daily, annual,
and seasonal time periods in several states across the nation. 6 The
EPA's various approvals led to two major lawsuits challenging the
EPA's authority to approve maximum loads for time periods other
than loads per day, such as maximum loads per year or season. 7 In
1. G. Tracy Mehan III, Assistant Adm'r for Water U.S. EPA, Address Before
the Committee on Environment and Public Works (Oct. 8, 2002), available at
http://www.epa.gov/water/speeches/021008tm.html (describing state of Nation's
waters before 1972 enactment of Clean Water Act).
2. See id. (describing level of pollution existing before enactment of Clean
Water Act).
3. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (2000) (setting forth purpose of CWA).
4. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2000) (noting requirement for states to establish
TMDLs and describing process of EPA approval).
5. See EPA, Fact Sheet: Water Quality Criteriaand Standards Plan - Prioritiesfor the
Future, http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/standards/planfs.html (last visited Oct.
27, 2007) (describing foundational approach for reaching clean water goals over
next ten years as motivation behind TMDL plan).
6. See Appellate Split on 'Daily'DischargesCould Prompt High Court Review (Appellate Split), INSIDE EPA, Apr. 28, 2006, at 18-9, available at www.insideepa.com
(describing EPA-approved loads across Nation); see also EPA, Total Maximum Daily
Loads, http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2007) (listing approved national TMDLs by state and region).
7. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. EPA, 446 F.3d 140, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(questioning meaning of daily as used in CWA); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.
Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91, 93 (2d Cir. 2001) (questioning EPA's authority to approve
pollutant loads for various time periods under CWA).
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each case involving the interpretation of the word "daily" within the
CWA, the courts analyzed statutory language and legislative intent
to reach their respective holdings. 8 Each court formed different
interpretations, despite applying the same analytical framework to
the same statutory language. 9 In 2001, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held the EPA has authority to approve maximum
loads for various time periods and is not restricted solely to approval of daily loads. 10 Conversely, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. EPA
(Friends of the Earth),1I the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) held the EPA does not have authority
to approve loads for any period of time other than a maximum
amount per day. 12 This circuit split has the potential to affect bod3
ies of water in every state of the Nation.'
This Note focuses on whether the D.C. Circuit employed the
proper analytical framework when interpreting the CWA. Section
II provides a brief summary of the facts of Friends of the Earth.1 4 Section III develops the legal background that gave rise to the CWA
and relevant case law, focusing on both the Second Circuit's interpretation of the CWA and the proper method courts should follow
in interpreting statutes.1 5 Section IV describes the D.C. Circuit's
16
approach to analyzing the CWA and the actions taken by the EPA.
Section V provides a critical analysis of the D.C. Circuit's approach
to interpreting the CWA and raises issues the court may have over8. See Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 144 (describing D.C. Circuit's analysis
and holding); Muszynski, 268 F.3d at 103 (stating Second Circuit's holding).

9. Compare Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 144 (interpreting daily narrowly
under Chevron analysis) with Muszynski, 268 F.3d at 103 (interpreting daily broadly
under Chevron analysis). See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (setting forth judicial analysis for agency regulations and interpretations of congressional statutes).
10. Muszynski, 268 F.3d at 103 (holding CWA does not require loads be established for strictly daily increments and EPA has discretion to approve loads for
various non-daily time periods where appropriate).
11. 446 F.3d 140 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
12. See id. (precluding EPA from establishing loads for non-daily time increments to comply with CWA terminology).
13. See generally Appellate Split, supra note 6 (discussing impact of Friends of the
Earthon EPA-approved loads across Nation); see also EPA, supra note 6 (listing EPAapproved TMDLs in each state).
14. For a discussion of the facts of Friends of the Earth, see infra notes 19-32 and
accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the underlying principles behind the CWA and
Chevron analysis, see infra notes 33-83 and accompanying text. See generally Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalRes. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (setting forth judicial analytical framework for interpreting legality of agency regulations).
16. For a further discussion of the D.C. Circuit's analysis, see infra notes 84-103
and accompanying text.
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looked in its analysis.1 7 Finally, Section VI discusses how Friends of
the Earth will affect future interpretations of the CWA, as well as the
potential impact the decision will have as other jurisdictions decide
how to implement the CWA and establish TMDLs.' 8
II.

FACTs

The Anacostia River, which flows from Maryland through
Washington, D.C., is one of the ten most polluted rivers in the
United States.' 9 Due to its sub-standard oxygen levels and excessive
turbidity, the Anacostia River did not meet water quality standards
set forth in the CWA. 20 In an attempt to decrease the Anacostia's
pollution and guide it toward meeting water quality standards, the
EPA approved two TMDLs: one limiting the annual discharge of
oxygen-depleting pollutants and another limiting the seasonal discharge of pollutants contributing to turbidity. 2 ' Based on the nature of the pollutants in the Anacostia, the District of Columbia
measured the loads of oxygen-depleting pollutants in years and turbidity pollutants in seasons; the District of Columbia then submitted both the annual and seasonal load proposals to the EPA for
approval. 2 2 The EPA approved both TMDLs, although neither lim23
ited daily pollutant discharge.
17. For a critical analysis of the D.C. Circuit's decision, see infra notes 104-38
and accompanying text.
18. For a further discussion of the impact of the D.C. Circuit's decision, see
infra notes 139-58 and accompanying text.
19. See Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 142 (quoting Kingman Park Civic Ass 'n v.
EPA, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1999)) (describing poor quality of Anacostia River
as background for litigation).
20. See Fiiends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 143 (listing reasons Anacostia River
failed to meet water quality standards). The Anacostia's low oxygen level is due to
biochemical pollutants that consume the oxygen. Id. Low oxygen results in risk of
suffocation for aquatic life. Id. High turbidity, characterized by murkiness, stunts
the growth of plants that rely on sunlight and impair recreational use. Id.
21. See id. (describing EPA's role in approving loads for various time periods,
ultimately giving rise to present lawsuit). Turbidity refers to the level of murkiness
in the water and is measured by the number of particles suspended in the water.
B.H. Munson et al., Water on the Web, http://waterontheweb.org/under/waterquality/turbidity.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2007) (explaining concept of turbidity
and its detrimental impact on water quality). A high level of murkiness is a characteristic of poor water quality and may negatively impact aquatic life. Id.
22. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. EPA, 346 F. Supp. 2d 182, 186 (D.D.C.
2004) (explaining EPA's rationale for approval of District of Columbia's proposed
loads based on prior study performed on Anacostia River and District of Columbia's proposal).
23. See Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 143 (questioning whether daily should
be ascribed literal definition).
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Consequently, Friends of the Earth, Inc. sued the EPA, asserting the CWA requires limitations on daily pollutant discharge but
24
does not provide for limitations on annual or seasonal discharge.
The EPA responded that, in enacting provisions for TDMLs of permissible pollutants, Congress intended to provide the EPA with discretion to establish annual and seasonal maximum loads in order to
aid bodies of water in meeting water quality standards. 25 The EPA
contended the "daily" provision should not be strictly construed,
because bodies of water can occasionally "tolerate large one-day discharges of certain pollutants" without compromising compliance
with water quality standards. 26 The EPA claimed Congress would
have included additional language to convey the strict requirement
if Congress had meant "daily" in a literal sense. 2 7 Furthermore, the
EPA argued a literal interpretation of the term "daily" would be
absurd, because there are times when the regulation would be less
28
effective if the EPA were to be held to such a strict requirement.
The D.C. District Court granted the EPA's motion for summary
judgment and held there was no clear evidence Congress intended
the EPA to calculate only daily pollutant load limits under the
CWA. 29 Further, the district court found the EPA reasonably determined the issuance of non-daily permits would meet daily water
quality standards.3 0 The district court also concluded the EPA's approval of annual and seasonal maximum loads was not arbitrary or
capricious.3 1 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district
court's judgment and adopted a literal interpretation of "daily,"
32
which excluded annual or seasonal loads.
24. See id. (explaining Friends of the Earth's grounds for lawsuit). The EPA
filed suit in the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which transferred the case to the District Court for the District of Columbia based on lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
25. See id. at 142 (stating EPA's argument on appeal).
26. Id. at 145 (stating purpose of maximum daily load remains intact despite
broader interpretation of daily term).
27. See id. at 144 (describing EPA's contention during oral argument that
Congress should have been clearer if it intended daily to be interpreted literally).
28. See Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 146 (describing EPA's final attempt to
demonstrate Congress could not have intended daily to be read literally).
29. Id. at 143-44 (stating holding of District Court for District of Columbia in
favor of EPA).
30. Id. at 144 (stating holding of District Court for District of Columbia in
agreement with EPA's actions preceding lawsuit); accord Fiends of the Earth, 346 F.
Supp. 2d at 185.
31. Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 144 (stating final district court determination in favor of EPA's argument); accord Friends of the Earth, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 185.
32. See Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 148 (reversing District Court for District
of Columbia and vacating EPA's approvals of annual and seasonal pollutant loads).
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III.

A.

BACKGROUND

Legislative Framework

Congress enacted the CWA "to restore and maintain the chem33
ical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."
Under the CWA, each state must identify waters within its borders
that are otherwise not subject to any water quality standards, because Congress's required effluent limitations are not strict enough
to encompass that particular body of water. :34 For the bodies of waters identified,
[e]ach State shall establish . . . the total maximum daily
load, for those pollutants which the Administrator identifies . . . as suitable for calculation. Such load shall be es-

tablished at a level necessary to implement the applicable
water quality standards with seasonal variations and a margin of safety which takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between effluent
35
limitations and water quality.
The CWA requires states and the District of Columbia to establish
TMDLs for certain pollutants in bodies of water that fail to meet
applicable water quality standards. 3 6 If the EPA approves the proposals, these TMDLs may be incorporated into permits specifying
33. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000) (describing desire to improve and maintain
integrity of Nation's waters as purpose behind implementation of CWA).
34. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1) (A) (2000) (requiring states to identify bodies
of water with poor water quality). Relevant text states: "[elach State shall identify
those waters within its boundaries for which the effluent limitations required by
section 1311 (b) (1) (A) and section 1311(b) (1) (B) of this title are not stringent
enough to implement any water quantity standard applicable to such waters." Id.
The term "State," by definition, includes the District of Columbia. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(3) (2000). "The term 'effluent limitation' means any restriction established by a State or the Administrator on quantities, rates, and concentrations of
chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents which are discharged from
point sources into .

.

. waters

....

"

33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (2000). Water quality

standards are defined as:
[p]rovisions of State or Federal law which consist of a designated use or
uses for the waters of the United States and water quality criteria for such
waters based upon such uses. Water quality standards are to protect the
public health or welfare, enhance the quality of water and serve the purposes of the [Clean Water] Act.
40 C.F.R. § 130.2(d) (2006).
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2000) (stating relevant terms of CWA provision upon which present lawsuit is based).
36. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2) (2000) (describing relevant provisions of CWA
requiring states to establish pollutant loads for bodies of water that do not meet
water quality standards); accord Fiends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 143 (describing provisions of CWA upon which present lawsuit is based).
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effluent discharges. 3 7 Ideally, if the pollution loads remain within
the amount allotted by the established TMDLs, the body of water
38
should meet water quality standards.
EPA regulations permit TMDLs to be "expressed in terms of
39
either mass per time, toxicity, or other appropriate measure."
The EPA stated all pollutants are suitable for calculation of TMDLs
under the proper conditions. 40 Nevertheless, the EPA did not perceive the development of TMDLs to be a prerequisite for adoption
41
or enforcement of water quality standards.
B.

Chevron Analysis

The Supreme Court established a method of analyzing an
agency's construction of a statute in the landmark case, Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (Chevron).42
First, a court must determine whether Congress has directly addressed the issue in dispute. 43 If Congress has directly addressed
the issue, then the court must defer to Congress's unambiguous,
expressed intent.4 4 If, however, Congress has not clearly and directly addressed the issue, then the court must determine whether
the agency's construction of the statute is permissible. 45 In analyzing whether an agency's construction is permissible, the court must
give considerable weight to the agency's construction, provided the
37. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2000) (describing implementation process
subsequent to EPA load approvals).
38. See Friends of the Earth,446 F.3d at 143 (stating anticipated result of compliance with established TMDLs). "Such load shall be established at a level necessary
to implement the applicable water quality standards with seasonal variations and a
margin of safety which takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the
relationship between effluent limitations and water quality." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(d)(1)(C) (2000).
39. 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(i) (2006) (defining total maximum daily load).
40. Total Maximum Daily Loads Under Clean Water Act Notice, 43 Fed. Reg.
60,665 (Dec. 28, 1978) accordFriends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 143 (stating applicable
EPA regulation).
41. Total Maximum Daily Loads Under Clean Water Act Notice, 43 Fed. Reg.
60,664 (Dec. 28, 1978). The EPA did not consider the establishment of TMDLs a
high priority because the practical results of TMDLs, namely the improvement of
water quality, were being achieved through state water quality management. Id.
42. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(setting forth judicial analysis for agency construction of statute). Agency regulations are upheld unless they are "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute." Id. at 844.
43. Id. at 842 (establishing analytical framework to be employed by court).
44. Id. at 842-43 (explaining first step of analysis for agency construction of
statutes is based on statutory language).
45. Id. at 843 (describing process for reviewing agency interpretation of statute where Congress has been silent on issue and instructing court not to impose its
own interpretation of statute).
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agency's construction was not "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute. ' 46 The Chevron Court analyzed statutory language, legislative history, and policy supporting the Clean Air Act
EPA's regulation was a reasonable interpreta(CAA) and held the
47
tion of the statute.
In Sierra Club v. EPA, 48 the Sierra Club petitioned the D.C. Circuit for review based on the contention that the EPA lacked authority to approve revisions to state implementation plans for ozone
standards. 49 Under the CAA, the EPA has authority to approve im5°
plementation plans devised by states to meet air quality standards.
The D.C. Circuit found the EPA exceeded its authority in approving revised state implementation plans, noting the51EPA's decision
to approve the plans was arbitrary and capricious.
In reaching its holding, the D.C. Circuit analyzed the CAA and
52
the EPA's actions, applying the standards set forth in Chevron.
The D.C. Circuit found Congress deliberately included certain exemptions from the CAA and did not intend for unlisted exemptions

46. Id. at 844 (describing presumption in favor of agency statutory construction). "When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision ...
centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable
choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail .... [F]ederal
judges . . .have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who
[have constituency]." Id. at 866; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). "[T]he reviewing court shall ...set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
be- arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.. . ." Id.
47. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (analyzing whether EPA regulation was reasonable construction of Clean Air Act). "[T] he meaning of a word must be ascertained in the context of achieving particular objectives, and the words associated
with it may indicate that the true meaning of the series is to convey a common
idea." Id. at 861 (describing statutory language analysis). In analyzing the legislative history of a statute, the court analyzes Congress's purpose and motivation for
enacting the statute. See id. at 863.
48. 294 F.3d 155 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
49. See id. at 158 (stating issue on appeal). In the process of approving states'
implementation plans, the EPA concluded contingency measures were not a
mandatory element of the revised implementation plans. See id. at 159 (describing
EPA's actions outside bounds of its role under Clean Air Act to approve statesubmitted implementation plans).
50. See id. at 158 (describing roles of states and EPA in Clean Air Act).
51. Id. (finding in favor of Sierra Club and holding EPA exceeded its authority in approving states' revised implementation plans).
52. Id. at 160 (describing Chevron analytical framework employed to determine whether EPA's actions exceeded CAA provisions). "The most reliable guide
to congressional intent is the legislation the Congress enacted .... " Id. at 161
(responding to EPA's argument encouraging court to interpret CAA to give effect
to broader congressional intent).
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to apply. 53 Nevertheless, the court acknowledged there are rare instances when it will look beyond a literal reading of statutory language, such as where the application of a statute leads to results

contrary to the drafters' intent. 54 The court stated, "[a]n agency
may not disregard 'the [c]ongressional intent clearly expressed in
the text simply by asserting that its preferred approach would be
better policy.' 55
Similarly, in New York v. EPA,56 the D.C. Circuit vacated the
Equipment Replacement Provision (ERP) promulgated by the EPA
because it was contrary to the plain language of the CAA. 57 The
court applied the Chevron test to determine whether the use of the
word "any" in the statute was ambiguous. 58 In its analysis, the court
noted, "the sort of ambiguity giving rise to Chevron deference 'is a
creature not of definitional possibilities, but of statutory context.' ,,59 The court determined that where Congress specifically addressed the issue, the meaning or ambiguity of certain statutory

words or phrases must be analyzed in light of their context and not
in isolation. 60 Courts must give effect to each word uttered within
the context of the particular statute. 6 1

In Engine ManufacturersAssociation v. United States EPA (Engine
Manufacturers),62 the Engine Manufacturers Association (EMA) dis53. See Sierra Club, 294 F.3d at 160 (inferring congressional intent from statutory language).
54. See id. at 160-61 (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. U.S. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1088
(D.C. Cir. 1996)) (stating exception to Chevron analysis).
55. Sierra Club, 294 F.3d at 160-61 (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass'n, 88 F.3d at 1089)
(stating agencies' obligation to follow congressional intent).
56. 443 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
57. Id. at 885-86 (finding in favor of New York and holding EPA's interpretation of any is contrary to congressional intent). The ERP allowed sources to use
replacement parts costing up to twenty percent of the value of the processing units
without triggering the permit process, based on a historical exclusion for minor
modifications. See id. at 883 (describing ERP and historical practice). The CAA
requires new and modified sources to complete the permit process and defines
modification as "any physical change." Id. (explaining CAA provisions).
58. See id. at 884-85 (employing Chevron test to determine meaning and purpose of any in CAA).
59. Id. (citations omitted) (describing applicable details of Chevron analysis).
60. See id. at 884-85 (describing method for court to analyze statute in context
of congressional intent); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (detailing first step of Chevron analysis). "In addition, [the
court] must be guided to a degree by common sense as to the manner in which
Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such economic and political magnitude to an administrative agency." ld. at 133.
61. See New York, 443 F.3d at 885-86 (internal citations omitted) (describing
step in court's analysis of statutory term in contention).
62. 88 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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63
agreed with the EPA's interpretation of "new" as used in the CAA.
6 4 Both
Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit applied-the Chevron analysis.
the EMA and the EPA set forth valid arguments for definitions of
"new;" therefore, the court held the absence of a definition of
"new" in the section of the CAA at issue did not satisfy the first step
65
of the Chevron analysis.

The decision in Engine Manufacturers is significant because it

66
provides further insight into the application of Chevron. In terms
of statutory construction, the court noted, "[t]he most traditional

tool .. .is to read the text; if it clearly requires a particular outcome, then the mere fact that it does so implicitly rather than ex67

pressly does not mean that it is 'silent' in the Chevron sense.
Plain meaning of statutory language is conclusive unless the draft68
ers' purpose was clearly contrary to the language used. In this
regard, the court may use legislative intent as a tool to interpret
statutory language only if the plain meaning of the statute produces
69
a result at odds with the drafters' intent. The court may not depart from the plain meaning of the statute unless there is70 sufficient
evidence Congress intended to warrant such a reading.
In Engine Manufacturers, the D.C. Circuit emphasized it is not
the courts' role to either improve a statute, as to better serve con-

63. Id. at 1082 (discussing background of case). The EPA adopted a "showroom-new" definition of the term "new" as used in the CAA rather than a datecertain definition. Id. The EPA's "showroom-new" definition was consistent with
the statutory definition of new in other sections of the CAA. Id.
64. See id. at 1084 (describing Chevron analysis used to interpret new in CAA).
65. See id. at 1085 (finding step one of Chevron analysis not satisfied because
Congress did not specifically provide definition for phrase new nonroad engine).
The EMA argued Congress would have included the definition of "new" if it had
intended to have the definition from another section of the CAA to apply. See id.
The EPA argued the exact opposite: if Congress meant to apply a different definition to the term, it would have included one in the statute. See id. Although the
EMA pointed to evidence indicating Congress's intent, it is commonly accepted
that "post-enactment statements cannot be used to change [c]ongressional intent
that is not announced at the time of enactment." Id. at 1087. "At best, [postenactment statements] are statements that the EPA could take into account in
deciding on a reasonable interpretation of the statute .... Id.
66. See id. at 1088 (describing Chevron process of determining congressional
intent).
67. Engine Mfts. Ass'n, 88 F.3d at 1088 (internal citations omitted) (describing
nuances of Chevron analysis to determine congressional intent).
68. Id. (describing limitations on plain language statutory interpretation).
69. See id. (explaining rare circumstance warranting consideration of legislative intent to interpret plain language of statute).
70. See id. at 1088-89 (demonstrating strict threshold before court may consider legislative intent). The court cannot ignore the statutory text even if the
court does not agree with it or believes it is a product of congressional oversight.
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gressional purpose, or to ignore congressional intent by claiming

the court's approach would be a better policy.7 1 "[T]o avoid a literal interpretation at Chevron step one, [the EPA] must show either
that, as a matter of historical fact, Congress did not mean what it
appears to have said, or that as a matter of logic and statutory structure, it almost surely could not have meant it. '' 72
Judge Tatel of the D.C. Circuit disagreed with the majority's
explanation of how to move beyond the first step of Chevron.73 In a
partial dissent, Judge Tatel emphasized the court should "look to
the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy[,]"
rather than focusing entirely on statutory language. 74 Judge Tatel
argued the court may depart from literal statutory meaning if compliance with plain language would produce a result at odds with
congressional intent or, in contrast to the majority, if the result of a
literal statutory interpretation would be unreasonable and at odds
75
with legislative policy as a whole.

In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Muszynski (Muszynski),76 various environmental groups sued the EPA, alleging the
EPA's approval of annual phosphorus TMDLs for New York reservoirs violated the CWA. 77 Natural Resources, an environmental
group, claimed EPA-approved annual TMDLs violated the plain
language of the CWA. 78 The EPA, on the other hand, asserted: (1)

the CWA was silent as to how TMDLs should be expressed; and (2)
the EPA's regulations provided for TMDLs to be expressed as mass
71. See id. at 1089 (emphasizing court's limited ability to interpret statutes
outside terms set forth by Congress).
72. Engine Mfts. Ass'n, 88 F.3d at 1089 (describing how to avoid literal statutory interpretation in first step of Chevron analysis). "[A]s long as the statutory
scheme is coherent and consistent, there generally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain language of the statute." Id. at 1092 (internal citations
omitted).
73. See id. at 1100 (Tatel, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)
(describing disagreement with majority's analysis of first step of Chevron). Interestingly, Judge Tatel authored the Friends of the Earthopinion for the D.C. Circuit. See
generally Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. EPA, 446 F.3d 140 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
74. Engine Mfts. Ass'n, 88 F.3d at 1100 (Tatel,J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (internal citations omitted) (disagreeing with majority's application
of Chevron and describing alternative approach to first step of Chevron analysis).
75. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (internal citations omitted) (describing low threshold for determining when it is appropriate
for court to look beyond plain language and consider policy and object of statute
in first step of Chevron).
76. 268 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2001).
77. Id. at 95-96 (describing amended complaint alleging EPA's approval of
TMDLs submitted by New York violated EPA's nondiscretionary CWA duty).
78. Id. at 97 (claiming EPA only has authority to approve daily loads and not
annual loads approved here).
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per unit of time.79 The Second Circuit sided with the EPA and held
the CWA does not require all TMDLs to be expressed solely in
80
The Second Circuit also conterms of maximum loads per day.
TMDLs for time periods
approve
to
cluded the EPA has discretion
8
other than loads per day. ' In its statutory analysis, the Second Circuit interpreted the TMDL provision broadly and found a narrow
82
Accordingly, the
interpretation overlooked the statute's purpose.
and held if a
decision
court's
district
the
affirmed
Second Circuit
it may be
water,
of
TMDL effectively regulates pollution in bodies
83
time.
of
unit
per
mass
expressed by any measure of
IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

In Friends of the Earth, the D.C. Circuit addressed whether the
word "daily," as used in the CWA, limited the EPA in establishing
pollutant loads on a daily basis or whether it allowed the EPA to
8 4 In performing a Chevron analysis, the
address other time periods.
D.C. Circuit examined: (1) the plain language of the CWA; (2) the
CWA.8 5
CWA's legislative history; and (3) the policy supporting the
Following the Chevron analysis, the court concluded the term "daily"
86
The
is unambiguous and adopted the term's literal meaning.
79. Id. (defending its approval of annual loads as permissible under CWA).

80. See id. at 103 (explaining how EPA-approved loads further purpose of
CWA by improving water quality to meet applicable standards).
81. Muszynski, 268 F.3d at 103 (noting EPA's discretion to approve TMDLs for
various periods of time).
82. See id. at 98 (describing plain language analysis employed to interpret
terms of CWA within context of entire statute). The Second Circuit did not believe Congress intended pollutant regulation to be so narrowly confined to regulate pollutants strictly on a daily basis. See id. at 99. "Such a reading strikes us as
absurd, especially given that for some pollutants, effective regulation may best occur by some other periodic measure than a diurnal one." Id.
83. See id. at 99 (interpreting daily broadly within context of entire statute and
in light of statute's purpose to improve water quality). The district court stated so
long as an agency's regulation does not contradict a statute's plain language, the
agency has reasonable authority to promulgate reasonable regulations which coincide with the statute's purpose. Id. at 96 (citing NaturalRes. Def. Council, Inc. v. Fox,
93 F. Supp. 2d 531, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)). The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York found, based on the nature of pollutants, the nondaily TMDLs were optimal and the EPA's approval of the TMDLs were reasonable
in the particular circumstances. Id.
84. See Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d 140, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (setting forth
issues on appeal as to whether CWA precludes EPA from approving pollutant loads
for annual or seasonal time periods and whether EPA improperly approved such
loads for Anacostia River).
85. Id. at 144-47 (describing Chevron analysis applied by D.C. Circuit).
86. See id. at 144-48 (analyzing EPA interpretation of TMDL within context of
Chevron and determining EPA improperly approved annual and seasonal pollutant
loads).
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D.C. Circuit Court overturned the D.C. District Court's decision
and held the use of the term "daily" precluded the EPA from establishing pollutant loads for any time period other than loads per
day.8 7 In its decision, the D.C. Circuit Court stated, "the parties
may move to stay the district court's order on remand to give either
the District of Columbia a reasonable opportunity to establish daily
load limits or [the] EPA a chance to amend its regulation declaring
'all pollutants . . . suitable' for daily loads. '88
A.

Plain Language of the Statute

The D.C. Circuit analyzed the plain language of the CWA
within the Chevron analytical framework.8 9 The CWA provides
"[e] ach state. shall establish . . . the total maximum daily load, for
those pollutants which the Administrator identifies . . . as suitable

for such calculation." 90 Because the EPA identified every pollutant
as suitable for calculation of TMDLs, the D.C. Circuit found the
CWA requires the District of Columbia to establish a TMDL for
every pollutant in the Anacostia River.9 '
The court found no ambiguity in the use of the specific phrase
"total maximum daily loads" and reiterated that the court has never
required Congress to include extraneous words. 9 2 According to the
court, if Congress intended the EPA to establish annual and seasonal loads in addition to total maximum daily loads, then Congress
would have included the necessary language in the provision. 9 3
Furthermore, Congress could have used the language "total maximum loads," excluding a specific time period from the provision. 94
87. See id. at 142 (finding daily unambiguous and interpreting term narrowly
to preclude EPA-approval of pollutant loads for time periods other than loads per
day).
88. Id. at 148 (internal citations omitted) (suggesting plan of action in recognition of parties' common goal to improve water quality of Anacostia River).
89. See Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 144 (setting forth Chevron analysis used
to determine whether EPA acted properly within CWA).
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2000) (setting forth disputed provision of

CWA).

91. See Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 144 (analyzing plain language of CWA
under Chevron). In identifying pollutants suitable for the calculation of total maximum daily loads, the EPA stated all pollutants are suitable for calculation under
proper technical conditions. Total Maximum Daily Loads Under Clean Water Act
Notice, 43 Fed. Reg. 60,665 (Dec. 28, 1978).
92. See Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 144 (discussing clarity of language in
CWA and refuting EPA's argument on how language could be even clearer).
93. See id. (portraying congressional intent through analysis of statutory
language).
94. See id. (explaining Congress's alternative in leaving temporal element of
total maximum loads open to interpretation).
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Instead, it specified a daily time period and, thus, left no time gap
for the EPA to fill. B.

Legislative History and Policy
The D.C. Circuit Court emphasized "[t]he most reliable guide

to congressional intent is the legislation Congress enacted .

. . .9

The court noted agencies have an "exceptionally high burden" in
97 In reproving the absurdity of legislation in the D.C. Circuit.
sponse to the EPA's argument that Congress established the maximum load provision in the CWA to promote compliance with water
quality standards, the D.C. Circuit Court ruled the establishment of
maximum daily loads does not hinder this policy. 98 The court
found the EPA failed to prove the establishment of maximum daily
loads was illogical. 99 As a result, the court was unable to agree with
the EPA's argument that Congress could not have intended to "require daily loads" as it was written. 10
The D.C. Circuit Court held even if an agency believes the language in a statute leads to undesirable consequences in some circumstances, the court cannot dismiss the statute's plain
language.1"" Suggesting the EPA address its arguments to Congress, the court asserted the "EPA may not 'avoid the
[c]ongressional intent clearly expressed in the text simply by assert' 2
ing that its preferred approach would be better policy."" "0 Because Congress specified a daily time period in the CWA and it is
95. See id. (discussing Congress's language choice in CWA provisions).
96. Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 146 (quoting Sierra Club v. EPA, 294 F.3d

155, 161 (D.C. Cir. 2002)) (rejecting EPA's policy justification that Congress could
not have meant statutory terms literally).
97. Id. (stating burden for absurdity and distinguishing instant case from Second Circuit decision in Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91 (2d

Cir. 2001)). In Muszynski, "the Second Circuit held that reading 'daily' to mean
daily would be 'absurd, especially given that for some pollutants, effective regulation may best occur by some other periodic measure than a diurnal one."' Id.
(internal citations omitted).
98. See Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 145 (overcoming EPA's argument and
demonstrating bodies of water that may be able to tolerate large one-day discharges of certain pollutants is not reason to find literal interpretation of CWA
conflicts with overall congressional intent to improve water quality).
99. See id. at 145-46 (stating EPA failed to meet its burden to show requirement of daily loads for certain pollutants was illogical).
100. Id. at 146 (refuting EPA's argument that Congress could not have intended to require solely daily loads.)
101. See id. at 145-46 (stating court does not have power to disregard legislation as it is written).
102. Id. at 145 (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. U.S. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1089

(D.C. Cir. 1996)) (suggesting EPA should bring its argument to Congress if it seeks
changes in CWA language).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008

13

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 3

136

VILIANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XIX: p. 123

the role of Congress, not the judiciary, to consider desired policy
changes in the provision, the court declined to allow the EPA to set
03
annual or seasonal maximum loads.'
V.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

In Friends of the Earth, although the D.C. Circuit properly assigned a literal interpretation to the word "daily" as used within the
CWA, the court's analysis does not address underlying issues that
could impact the court's interpretation. 10 4 By interpreting the
word "daily" literally, the D.C. Circuit rejected the district court's
findings that the term was ambiguous and that the CWA did not
manifest a congressional intent requiring the EPA to calculate only
daily pollutant loads. 10 5 By applying a literal interpretation of
"daily," the D.C. Circuit also rejected the Second Circuit's holding
in Muszynski that based on congressional intent such a literal interpretation of "daily" was absurd.' 0 6
The D.C. Circuit resolved the first step of the Chevron analysis
by concluding Congress specifically addressed the time period in
prescribing TMDLs. 10 7 The court referenced the dictionary definition of "daily" and found no ambiguity in the term as used in the
CWA. 10 8 Under the Chevron analysis, if a court finds Congress directly addressed an issue and there is no ambiguity, then that court
must defer to the statutory provision unless the provision is absurd
or contrary to congressional intent. 10 9
103. See Friendsof the Earth, 446 F.3d at 145 (describing Court's limited role to
address policy concerns). If daily maximum loads were inappropriate for some
pollutants and the establishment of daily loads "conflicted with the requirement
that TMDLs implement the applicable water quality standards," the EPA's argument would be more meritorious. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (describing
situation where EPA would have stronger argument).
104. See generally id. (analyzing daily using Chevron analysis and interpreting
daily literally).
105. See Friendsof the Earth, Inc. v. EPA, 346 F. Supp. 2d 182, 189 (D.D.C. 2004)
(holding Congress did not intend daily to be strictly construed and finding EPA's
interpretation of daily reasonable). See generally Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d 140
(analyzing language of CWA and interpreting daily literally).
106. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir.
2001) (interpreting daily broadly to best meet goals behind CWA provision).
107. See Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 144 (explaining Congress could have
left gap by establishing total maximum loads rather than TMDLs).
108. See id. (defining daily by dictionary definition and common use acceptance in first step of Chevron analysis).
109. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84344 (1984) (setting forth method for analyzing agency interpretation of statutory
language).
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In contrast to the D.C. Circuit's prior holding in New York v.
EPA, which directed courts to look to the context of a statute to
determine whether a term is ambiguous, in Friends of the Earth, the
court found Congress specifically addressed the time period provision in the CWA and further found the "daily" provision unambiguous based on its dictionary definition. 10 While this definition of
"daily" seems to be an unambiguous term, in New York v. EPA, the
D.C. Circuit held that it is important to analyze the term within the
context of the statute in order to determine ambiguity under Chevron."' Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit has previously held deference
should be given to the EPA's construction of the CWA; the CWA "is
to be given a reasonable interpretation which is not parsed and dissected with the meticulous technicality applied in testing other statutes and instruments."' 1 2 In Friendsof the Earth, the D.C. Circuit did
not delve into the definition of "daily" within its statutory context. 1 13 Instead, it relied on the dictionary definition of1 4"daily" and
stopped its analysis at the plain meaning of the term.'
The D.C. Circuit's analysis in Friends of the Earth overlooked the
Supreme Court's determination "that the [CWA] should be liberally construed ... to avoid harsh and incongruous results and that
the complexity of the [CWA] militates in favor ofjudicial deference
to [the] EPA's statutory construction."'1 5 Under the CWA, each
state is required to set forth TMDLs for pollutants and loads, which
are set at the "level necessary to implement the applicable water
quality standards with seasonal variations and a margin of safety
which takes into account any lack of knowledge" of the relationship
110. See generally New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880, 884 (stating new is ambiguous
and court must give effect to context of entire statute to determine meaning of
term).

111. See Friendsof the Earth, 446 F.3d at 144 (stating daily is unambiguous); New
York, 443 F.3d at 884 (finding common term new is ambiguous and describing
ambiguity analysis under Chevron) (internal citations omitted).
112. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, District of Columbia Water and
Sewer Authority v. Friends of the Earth, Inc., No. 05-5015 (U.S. July 26, 2006),
2006 WL 2085275 (quoting Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 292 (D.C.
Cir. 1981)) (finding complexity of CWA facilitates judicial deference to EPA's statutory construction).
113. See id. (discussing District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority's
claim that D.C. Circuit defined daily in isolation).
114. See Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 144 (defining daily as every day per
dictionary definition).
115. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 21, District of Columbia Water and
Sewer Authority v. Friends of the Earth, Inc., No. 05-5015 (U.S. July 26, 2006),
2006 WL 2085275 (citing Chemical Mfts. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470
U.S. 116, 125 (1985)) (stating why District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority
believes United States Supreme Court should hear case and find EPA acted within
its authority).
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between water quality and effluent limitations. 1 6 The definitions
provisions in the CWA do not include a definition for "daily" as
used within the Water Pollution Prevention Control chapter; however, they do provide definitions for other common terms, such as
"pollutant," "person," and "[s] tate."' 17 The Federal Register's definition of a TMDL does not include a specific time period, but
rather is a general definition based on the purpose for establishing
TMDLs. "s Alternatively, the Code of Federal Regulations provides
a vague definition of TMDLs in terms of time requirements but
does not specifically state pollutant loads must be expressed in
terms of amount per day." 9 Therefore, although it found no ambiguity within the dictionary definition of "daily," the D.C. Circuit
failed to follow its ruling in New York v. EPA and to consider the
0
context of the term and legislative purpose behind the provision.12
The D.C. Circuit also disagreed with the EPA's argument that
Congress could have been clearer in its expectations if it had stated
the TMDL "shall be expressed as a quantity per day or average per
day." 12 1 The court found because Congress used the term "daily" in
providing for the establishment of TMDLs, Congress required the
effluent loads to be stated as loads per day. 1 22 The D.C. Circuit
previously held "courts must give effect to each word of a statute"
and, since the term "daily" is expressed in the statute, it cannot be
116. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2006) (describing how states should set
TMDL levels based on goal of CWA to improve water quality).
117. See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006) (defining various terms within
chapter).
118. See Total Maximum Daily Loads Under Clean Water Act Notice, 43 Fed.
Reg. 60,662 (Dec. 28, 1978) (defining TMDL generally). "A TMDL can generally
be defined as the pollutant loading for a segment of water that results in an ambient concentration equal to the numerical concentration limit required for that
pollutant by the numerical or narrative criteria in the water quality standards." Id.
119. See 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(i) (2006) (describing various ways to express pollutant loads within the context of a TMDL). "TMDLs can be expressed in terms of
either mass per time, toxicity, or other appropriate measure." Id.
120. Compare Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. EPA, 446 F.3d 140, 145 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (rejecting EPA's argument for context-based interpretation of term), with
New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880, 885-86 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (describing contextual analysis surrounding term in CAA).
121. Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 144 (rejecting EPA's argument and finding Congress could not be clearer without including unnecessary extraneous
words). "Daily" is defined as "occurring or being made, done, or acted upon every
day." Id. (quoting Webster's Third New InternationalDictionary, 570 (1993)) (providing dictionary definition to demonstrate clarity of term). "Daily" may also be defined as "every weekday" or "every day." Webster's Third New InternationalDictionary,
570 (1993) (defining daily and demonstrating potential ambiguity of term).
122. See Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 144 (focusing on Congress's word
choice to determine congressional intent).
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overlooked.'12 3 Therefore, according to the court, to require that
the statute include a phrase that TMDLs must be calculated based
on an average amount per day (as suggested by the EPA) 1 would
24
require unwarranted redundancy in the statutory language.
The term "daily" is not ambiguous as analyzed within the statutory context; therefore, a court cannot advance past the first step of
the Chevron analysis unless there are additional circumstances that
warrant further analysis.' 25 Nevertheless, a court may analyze legiscontradict conlative intent if enacting the statute as written would
126
outcome.
absurd
an
produce
or
intent
gressional
The absurdity standard is inherently problematic, however, because the level of absurdity required to disregard statutory language
is undefined.' 2 7 While the Second Circuit found the strict daily pollutant load requirement absurd when considering the nature of
1 28
The D.C. Circuit insome pollutants, the D.C. Circuit disagreed.
stead emphasized that a strict daily pollutant load requirement improves water quality and noted that the EPA itself recognized all
29
pollutants were suitable for TMDL calculation.
Consequently, where there is no absurdity or result contrary to
congressional intent, the EPA may be forced to accept a certain
position it does not support, because it is bound by the statutory

123. New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880, 885-86 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal citations
omitted) (describing court's duties in its analysis of agency's statutory interpretation). For a further discussion about the analysis in New York, see supra notes 56-61
and accompanying text.
124. See Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 144 (stating D.C. Circuit never required Congress to use extraneous words).
125. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984) (providing court must adhere to statutory language where Congress addressed issue directly and unambiguously). "Chevron does not say that an agency
must interpret a statute in the manner most faithful to the enacting Congress; an
agency need only show that its preferred interpretation is not contrary to the original legislative intent." John Copeland Nagle, Corrections Day, 43 UCLA L. REV.
1267, 1289-290 (1996) (describing nuances of Chevron and their impact on analysis
of agency interpretation of statutes).
126. See Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 145 (stating EPA's claim may have
carried more weight if enacting plain language of statute led to results which conflicted with purpose of statute); see also NaturalRes. Def. Council, Inc. v. Muszynski,
268 F.3d 91, 98-9 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that maintaining statute as enacted
would lead to absurd results).
127. See Nagle, supra note 125, at 1288 (describing issues in determining
whether statutory language is absurd).
128. See Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 146 (rejecting absurdity argument
promulgated in Muszynski and finding EPA did not meet high burden of demonstrating Congress could not have intended statutory language as written).
129. See id. (emphasizing weaknesses of EPA's absurdity argument).
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language of the CWA.1 30 The EPA cannot correct a statute to pro1
mulgate the EPA's preferred policy over congressional policy. 31
While statutory language is the best evidence of congressional intent, courts have occasionally found that judicial statutory correction is warranted when statutory language is troubling and other
evidence of congressional intent is compelling. 132 In this case, however, the D.C. Circuit found no conflict between congressional in33
tent and the statute.1
With respect to a statute's judicial interpretation, Congress
"blames the courts... when an interpretation has become accepted
in the community even if that interpretation does not necessarily
reflect the intent of the enacting Congress." 3 4 Notwithstanding
the D.C. Circuit's holding in Friends of the Earth, the EPA's statutory
interpretation may become accepted precedent throughout the Nation as the EPA has approved annual and seasonal TMDLs in sev135
eral states.
If ...

courts (or... agencies) have interpreted a statute a

particular way and Congress has not amended the statute,
a court may assume ...

Congress agrees with the interpre-

tation because it has acquiesced in it. The argument gains
force .

.

. [with proof] Congress considered the issue but

13 6
declined to act.

In Muszynski, the Second Circuit held that under the CWA, the EPA
has discretion to approve TMDLs for time periods other than

130. See Nagle, supra note 125, at 1277 (discussing potential impact of mistakes in statutory language).
131. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 294 F.3d 155, 161 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Engine
Mfrs. Ass'n v. U.S. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1996)) (rejecting EPA's policy
argument requesting court to look at broad purpose of statute to determine intent
and stating best tool for determining congressional intent is statutory text).
132. See Nagle, supra note 125, at 1288-89 (discussing limited instances where
courts correct statutes due to troubling statutory language coupled with compelling legislative intent otherwise).
133. See Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 145 (discussing compatibility of CWA's
purpose to improve water quality standards with narrow interpretation of daily limiting EPA approval to only daily loads).
134. Nagle, supra note 125, at 1279 (discussing Congress's criticism of courts'
statutory interpretations).
135. See Appellate Split, supra note 6, at 18-9 (describing impact of holding with
respect to established annual and seasonal loads across Nation); see also EPA, supra
note 6 (listing EPA-approved TMDLs across Nation by state and body of water).
136. Nagle, supra note 125, at 1317 (describing courts' interpretation of Congress's inaction following agency or court statutory interpretation).
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daily.' 37 Nevertheless, several years have passed since the Second
Circuit's 2001 decision, and Congress has not amended the CWA
provisions to specify TMDLs shall be limited strictly to daily
loads. 138 Because of Congress's failure to amend the CWA following Muszynski, Congress may have acquiesced to the community
standard of establishing annual and seasonal loads; therefore, congressional intent may conflict with the D.C. Circuit's decision in
Friends of the Earth.
VI.

IMPACT

The D.C. Circuit's literal interpretation of the term "daily" created a circuit split by conflicting with the Second Circuit's broad
interpretation and allowance for the creation of maximum pollutant loads for various time periods. 139 The EPA has approved annual and seasonal loads in several states, so this circuit split will
impact existing and future TMDLs across the Nation. 140 Additionally, due to the D.C. Circuit's "authority to review federal rulemakings," it is unclear whether the D.C. Circuit's decision will carry
more weight than if the ruling had been made in a different
circuit. 141

The EPA has several options available to facilitate compliance
with the court's literal interpretation of the term "daily. " 1 42 The
EPA has the authority to change its regulation, which proclaimed
all pollutants are suitable for daily loads; however, the court has no
137. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91, 103 (2d Cir.
2001) (holding CWA does not require pollutant loads be expressed strictly as loads
per day and EPA has discretion to approve loads for other time measurements).
138. See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2000) (discussing history and purpose of
CWA).

139. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. EPA, 446 F.3d 140, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(describing application of Chevron analysis and interpreting daily strictly to preclude EPA-approval of pollutant loads for other time periods); see also NaturalRes.
Def. Council, Inc. v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91, 103 (2d Cir. 2001) (interpreting daily
broadly to permit EPA-approval of pollutant loads for various time periods).
140. See Appellate Split, supra note 6, at 18-9 (describing impact of holding with
respect to established seasonal annual loads across nation); see also EPA, supra note
6 (listing EPA-approved TMDLs across Nation by state and body of water).
141. Appellate Split, supra note 6, at 19 (stating unnamed industry attorney's
opinion on potential impact of D.C. Circuit holding). "[T]he source notes that
the D.C. Circuit is often treated as having more weight and more authority than
other circuits." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
142. See Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 148 (suggesting parties move to stay
district court's order to give District of Columbia opportunity to revise pollutant
loads or EPA opportunity to amend regulation); see also David Loos, Water Pollution:
Grumbles Says EPA ConsideringSeveral Options After TMDL Ruling,GREENWIRE, May 3,
2006, available at www.eenews.net/gw/ (describing EPA's position at National
Clean Water Policy Forum following court's holding in Friends of the Earth).
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authority to enact or amend the regulation. 143 The court also instructed interested parties to direct statutory ambiguity concerns to
Congress and the EPA for resolution.1 44 Heeding this suggestion,
at the National Clean Water Policy Forum, Ben Grumbles, Chief
Water Administrator for the EPA, stated: "[w] e will look at whether
...we can respond to the decision in a non-regulatory way, ...
[whether] we need to revise our regulations on TMDLs, and ...
[whether] the best approach is working with Congress on a
145
targeted statutory change.'
Due to potential confusion created by the circuit split after
Friends of the Earth and the prevalence of annual and seasonal
TMDLs around the country, this case had the potential to be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. 14 6 The District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority, an intervenor-defendant in
Friends of the Earth, filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court on July 21, 2006.147 Despite the farreaching implications of the circuit split, the petition for a writ of
certiorari was denied on January 16, 2007.148 In a jurisdiction
where there is no precedent, courts may interpret the CWA provision either literally or broadly, depending on which circuit opinion
149
the court finds more persuasive.
In response to Friends of the Earth, the EPA circulated a draft
guidance intended to implement the D.C. Circuit's holding.1 50
The draft guidance "gives regulatory authorities the option of using
annual or seasonal limits in enforceable clean water permits-as
long as the seasonal or annual limits are consistent with TMDLs
143. See Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 146 (contrasting EPA's authority and
role to amend regulation with court's limited role to interpret statute as written).
144. See id. at 148 (explaining alternative options for interested parties given
court's limited authority).
145. Loos, supra note 142 (describing EPA's considerations in its response to
Friends of the Earth opinion).
146. See Appellate Split, supra note 6, at 18 (describing one industry attorney's
perspective of future of Friends of the Earth case).
147. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, District of Columbia Water and Sewer
Authority v. Friends of the Earth, Inc., No. 05-5015 (U.S. July 26, 2006), 2006 WL
2085275 (presenting issues as to whether D.C. Circuit's decision contravenes basic
principles of statutory construction and whether decision leads to absurd and unjust results).
148. D.C Water and Sewer Auth. v. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1121
(2007) (mem) (denying petition for writ of certiorari).
149. See generally Appellate Split, supra note 6, at 18-9 (explaining confusion in
establishing future TMDLs due to circuit split).
150. See generally Industry Warns EPA Guide May Not End Fight On Daily' TMDLs,
WATER POLICY REPORT, July 24, 2006, available at www.insideepa.com (discussing
potential effects of EPA's draft guidance).
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containing daily increments . . . ."51 Environmental organizations
view the EPA's draft guidance as the least intrusive method to incor52
porate the Friends of the Earth decision into the TMDL program.1
Industry sources believe, however, the draft guidance will not likely
deter litigation initiated by environmental organizations because
the draft does not require daily limits in enforceable discharge permits.' 5 3 Environmental activists will not support the guidance unless the EPA sets such daily limits, demonstrated by one case where
environmental activists sued the EPA to impose daily limits in both
154
the TMDLs and the resulting permits.
The D.C. Circuit created a circuit split by adopting a literal interpretation of the term "daily" as being the only permissible time
period for which the EPA could establish maximum pollutant
loads. 155 This holding is contrary to the Second Circuit's broader
interpretation of the term "daily" in Muszynski, which permitted the
establishment of maximum pollutant loads for various time periods.1 56 In jurisdictions where the issue has not yet been decided,
however, the EPA can continue to approve maximum pollutant
loads for any time period. 15 7 The D.C. Circuit left the EPA with
several ways to comply with its holding.15 8 As the EPA struggles to
find the method of compliance that best suits its needs, the EPA
can expect to face continued controversy. Consequently, environmental organizations will continue to dive deep within their re151. Id. (explaining terms of EPA draft guidance). With respect to the draft
guidance, while it may appear the EPA is technically complying with the D.C. Circuit's decision, the EPA is actually acting contrary to the environmental activists'
intent. See id. (developing environmentalist organizations' purported view on
EPA's draft guidance).
152. See id. (describing background behind environmentalist organizations'
distrust of EPA's draft guidance).
153. See id. (discussing industry opinion on impact of EPA's draft guidance).
154. See id. (describing background of Friends of the Earth lawsuit and general
environmentalist organizations' perceptions of draft guidance).
155. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. EPA, 446 F.3d 140, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

(interpreting daily narrowly to preclude EPA-approval of annual and seasonal pollutant loads).
156. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91, 103 (2d Cir.

2001) (interpreting daily broadly and emphasizing EPA's discretion to approve
pollutant loads for various time periods).
157. See generally Appellate Split, supra note 6, at 18-9 (describing impact of

Friends of the Earth opinion with respect to established seasonal and annual loads
across the Nation and future implementation of TMDLs); see also EPA, supra note 6
(listing approved TMDLs per state).
158. See Friendsof the Earth, 446 F.3d at 148 (suggesting EPA amend regulation
claiming all pollutants suitable for TMDL calculation); see also Loos, supra note 142
(stating EPA needs to revise TMDL regulation or request Congress amend language in CWA).
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sources, ultimately hoping to improve the quality of our Nation's

troubled waters.
Rachel L. Stern
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